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ABSTRACT 
This paper deals with the problem of whether diversity of beliefs or
consensus leads to a higher level of R and D spending in an industry, 
or a faster rate of technical progress, or a lower price for the 
industry's product, The answer depends upon characteristics of the 
demand function for industry output as well as the density functions 
reflecting probability beliefs of firm managers, Sufficient condi-
tions are given for consensus (diversity) to ''pay'' in terms of R and 
D spending and/or the rate of technological progress, and R and D 
spending under marke,t incentives is contrasted with an ''optimal'' 
level of R and D expenditures, The analysis is illustrated in more 
detail for the case of exponential density functions, 
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I, INTRODUCTION 
This paper is concerned with the role that expectations play 
in the allocation of funds for research and development in an 
industry. In particular, we are interested in the question as to 
whether differences of beliefs among firm managers in an industry as 
to the prospective payoffs from R and D tend to increase or to 
decrease the amount of R and D spending within an industry, and what 
effect this has on the rate of technical progress in the industry. 
For example, when each firm manager believes that other firms have as 
good a chanoe of producing a profitable innovation as his firm, do 
differences of beliefs among firm managers as to the ohanoes of 
success encourage or dis oourage R and D expenditures in the industry 
as compared to commonly shared beliefs as to the chances of success? 
To put it another way, does consensus or diversity ''pay'' in the 
sense of increasing the level of R and D expenditures in an industry? 
Viewed in this way, the problem considered in this paper is related to 
1 This research was supported in part under a grant from the 
Department of Energy, We also wish to thank Forrest Nelson, Dave 
Grether, and Gib Bogle for their helpful comments, and Jeanne 
Wadsworth and Leslie Fort for their typing of this paper. The 
intellectual stimulus for the paper comes from many conversations with 
Burt Klein concerning issues discussed in his recent work; but he 
should not be held responsible for the specifics of our model or our 
interpretation of the problem posed here, 
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that of assessing the effects of government long term forecasts as to 
future prospects for an industry (assuming they are believed by firms 
in the industry) on R and D spending and on the rate of technical 
progress in the industry. 
As a matter of definition, we describe an industry as 
operating under strong uncertainty if individuals who are 
knowledgeable about the industry (including firm managers) have 
different beliefs as to the future prospects for the industry. We 
take the view that individual participants in an industry all have 
subjective probability distributions over possible outcomes for the 
industry, but under strong uncertainty there simply haven't been 
enough public experiments conducted to enable the subjective 
probabilities of informed individuals to converge to a state of 
identical probabilities, as in the famous Savage (4) theorem. 
So, in an industry operating under strong uncertainty, 
individuals make decisions concerning the future based on divergent 
subjective beliefs aa to the occurrence of various states of the 
world, Mutual interactions among these decisions lead to a market 
equilibrium for the industry that involvea a certain pattern of 
expenditures on the part of firms (including expenditures on R and D), 
and a certain pattern of market shares, Associated with this is a 
certain rate of technical progress. In principle at least, we can 
contrast such an equilibrium with one that obtains under weak 
uncertainty, defined as a situation in which informed individuals 
within an industry all have the same subjective probability beliefs 
�·· 
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concerning future prospects for the industry, For example, if a 
government bureau announces a set of probabilities for possible future 
states of the world, and if firms in an industry accept these 
probabilities and act on the basis of them, then the industry would be 
operating under weak uncertainty, 
In our analysis of the impact of diversity of beliefs or 
consensus on R and D activity in an industry, we employ a highly 
simplified model of the R and D process, In this model, firms can 
differ from one another in their beliefs as to the ''effectiveness'' 
of their R and D operations (the payoffs from R and D expenditures), 
and in the amounts spent on R and D. With consensus, beliefs to R and 
D effectiveness as well as R and D expenditures are the same for all 
\ 
firms; under divergent beliefs, they differ, In comparing the results 
obtained under divergent beliefs with those that hold under commonly 
shared beliefs, we assume that the commonly shared beliefs are 
centered at the mean of the distribution of the divergent beliefs, We 
examine the questions as to whether diversity or consensus leads to a 
higher level of R and D spending in an industry, and as to which is 
associated with a higher rate of technical progress, 
Even with the simplifications introduced into our model of the 
R and D process, the results are ambiguous, Whether diversity or 
consensus will lead to larger R and D expenditures or to a faster rate 
of technical progress or to a lower price for the product depends in 
general on the probability distributions over the payoffs from R and D 
and on the properties of the demand curve for the industry's product. 
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However, sufficient conditions are stated such that diversity ''pays'' 
or consensus ''pays,'' In one speoial case that of exponential 
probability distributions -- these problems are examined in detail. 
Finally, some tentative statements are made concerning the optimality 
of a market oriented R and D process, 
II, A MODEL OF R and D EXPENDITURES AND SUBJECTIVE BELIEFS 
Consider an industry in which there are n firms, each engaged 
in R and D activities aimed at producing a standardized product, The 
number oi firms in the industry is fixed, so that entry of new firms 
is not taken into account in our story of the industry, We do not 
attempt to model in detail the complex and interrelated decisions that 
are made by firms in the industry, Instead, we will examine a highly 
simplified and stylized R and D game that operates according to the 
following rules. 
Firm i, i = 1, ,,,, n, invests an amount Ri today in R and D 
with the objective of producing units of the standardized product 
tomorrow, Let Ci denote the per unit oost of production of the
product for firm i tomorrow, after Ri is spent today on R and D, Ci 
is taken to be a random variable with Ri a parameter of the
probability density function over Ci' We assume constant returns so 
that any level of output can be produced tomorrow at the per unit cost 
th Let fij(Cj;Rj) denote the i firm's subjective probability over 
firm j's per unit cost tomorrow, Under weak uncertainty (commonly 
shared beliefs) there is agreement among all firms as to the 
' 
probability density function for any Cj; that is, under weak
uncertainty we would have fij(Cj;Rj) = fkj(Cj;Rj) for every i, k 1, 
,,,, n and for every j, With strong uncertainty, there is no 
guarantee that beliefs of all firms concerning any one firm's 
prospects are identical. 
s 
We adopt the realistic assumption that at the time that firm i 
(i = 1, ,,,, n) must make its R and D investment decision, it does not 
know the amounts invested by other firms, After all R and D decisions 
have been taken and after the random variables are observed, then all 
of the per unit costs Ci(i = 1, ,,,, n) are made known, We restrict 
our attention to a simple two-period model in which there is R and D 
investment today and sale of the produot tomorrow, Admittedly, there 
are interesting and important extension of this case to the multi-
period horizon case, but even the two-period model is not without some 
analytical oomplications, and we have not as yet attempted to 
generalize our simplified structure, 
To keep things manageable, we assume that all firms are 
expected profit maximizers, Then the decision problem for firm k is 
to choose R and D expenditures � today to maximize discounted
expected prof its, which are determined as follows, 
Given the inverse industry demand function p = p(Q), and given 
a minimum per unit cost CL among the firms in the industry, then the 
unconstrained monopoly price and output are such that MC(Q•) = �· 
where Q• is the monopoly output, Let p•(CL) denote the monopoly price 
dp•(CL) 
given a per unit cost of CL' so that Q• dQ + p•(CL) = �·
Consider expected profits Ek for firm k, Firm k spends Rk 
dollars this period on R and D, Next period, firm k earns nothing 
unless it is the low cost firm, If firm k is the low cost firm, then 
it beoomes the sole seller of the product, It will charge what the 
market will bear, This is the unconstrained monopoly price p• if it 
is free to do so, that is, if the second lowest cost firm has a per 
unit cost in excess of p•. However, if the per unit cost of the 
second lowest cost firm is less than the monopoly price p•, firm k 
charges a price equal to the per unit cost of the second lowest cost 
firm, 
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Let C S denote the per unit cost of the second lowest cost firm 
with S., the per unit cost of firm k, where firm k is assumed to be the 
lowest cost firm in the industry, Then Figure 1 identifies the set of 
events s1, where firm k is the lowest cost firm and charges C S per 
unit; the set s2 , where firm k is the lowest cost firm and charges 
p• (CL)' the unconstrained monopoly price, per unit; and the set s3, 
where firm k is not the lowest cost firm. 
From the monopoly first order condition, we have 
( .!ht! p• CL) = CL - Q• dQ , so that 
.!ht! order condition implies dC > L 
p• (CL) > CL' Furthermore, the second 
0, hence sl forms a band between the 
sets S2 and s3 as shown in Figure 1, 
Figure 2 displays the same situation in terms of industry 
demand and minimum per unit cost CL' Given CJ_,p• (CL) separates the 
diagram so that if C S lies between CJ_ and p• (CL)' the output price 
P = C S' while if Cs > p• (CL)' then P = p• (CL)'
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It is convenient to characterize firms in terms of the 
productivity or effectiveness of R and D expenditures (as this is 
perceived by the various firm managers), Let aj denote the measure of 
effectiveness of a dollar of R and D·expenditures for firm j, where aj 
is taken to be a constant independent of R
j' Then we write 
fkj(cj;Rj! = fkj (Cj;ajRj)' To keep the notation as simple as 
possible, we have not indicated that aj is that perceived by firm k, 
but this is implied by ajRj 
appearing in the function fkj
('),
Expected profits for firm k, Ek' may then be written as
E = _L k l+r 
where r is the one period interest rate,2 
In the expression for E1, the term 
i
�fki<cs;aiRi)
jl�lk 
(1-Fkj<cs;ajRj)) is the p
df such that the lowest 
per unit cost among firms in the industry other than k is C S, Then 
the first integral inside the square brackets is the expected profits 
for firm k, given that firm k is the low cost firm with per unit cost 
2 This formulation assumes that the industry demand function 
approaches the price axis asymptotically. If the demand curve reaches 
the price axis at p s��h that Q (p) = 0, then the upper limit of 
integration becomes Q ( 0) instead of 00, 
CL, �<C S< p• (CL), so that firm k charges Cs per unit. The second 
integral gives expected prof its for firm k, given that firm k is the 
low coat firm with per unit cost �· � < p• (CL) < C S, so that firm k 
charges the monopoly price p• (CL)' Weighting the sum of these 
integrals by fkk (CL;��), the pdf that firm k's cost is �· and 
integrating, we obtain expected net prof its next period for firm k, 
Discounting this to the present and deducting Rk then gives the 
discounted present value of expected profits for firm k. 
III, A ''Q UA SI SOLIP SI STIC'' INTERPRETATION OF THE R and D MODEL 
In our model of firm decision making with respect to R and D, 
each of the n firms in the industry is simultaneously attempting to 
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choose an optimal level of its own R and D expenditures, which depends 
on the R and D expenditures chosen by all other firms, without knowing 
what the probability beliefs of other firms are, much less their 
choices of R and D expenditures. One way in which to handle this 
problem is as follows, 
Assume that each firm thinks of all other firms as possessing 
the same information and the same beliefs that it has, i. e. , firms are 
''quasi-solipsistic,'' Thus firm k (k = 1, , , , , n) acts as though 
every firm has the same subjective probability density that firm k has 
as well as the same value of a, This means that firm k acts on the 
belief th�t every firm in the industry will choose the same level of R 
and D expenditures that firm k does in maximizing discounted expected 
profits. Thus firm k evaluates its first order condition for profit 
maximization at the point Ri = �· i = 1,, , , ,n, with 
ai = � i = 1,, , , ,n as well, 
Then firm k chooses � to satisfy the first order conditions 
where 
Generally speaking, in what follows we will assume a regular 
interior solution (� > O, 
a2E 
� 
an; 
< 0 at the optimum) to the
maximization problem, However it should be pointed out that there 
exist oases (e, g, , constant elasticity industry demand with an 
exponential pdf) where either no maximum exists or where a corner 
solution (� = 0) obtains. 
� k k Let a� = 0 (�, ak)' so that 0 C�,ak) = 0, with 
a2E 
0k = .::...._:Jo < O at a regular interior maximum, We next specialize our � 
- an; 
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problem by assuming that all firms have the same pdfs fkj over the 
\ 
costs of other firms; firms differ from one another only in their 
beliefs as to the effectiveness or productivity parameter a (and the 
level of R and D expenditures R), Thus firm k has the same pdfs as 
10 
firm i, but firm k believes that all firms operate with a value <\. of
the effectiveness parameter and with expenditures � while firm i 
believes that all firms operate with a value ai of that parameter and 
expenditures Ri' What this means is that 
0k (�,ak) = 0(�,'\) for k=1, ,,,, n; the functional forms 0
k are the 
same for all firms, 
In our formulation of the R and D decision problem, each firm 
k chooses an optimal level of R and D expenditures under the 
assumption that every other firm, operating under the same beliefs and 
with the same value of a, will choose the same level of R and D 
expenditures that k does, This ''quasi-aolipsistio'' assumption may 
not turn out to be correct, of course, Under weak uncertainty 
(consensus), since all firms do in fact have the same values of the 
effectiveness parameter a and the same pdfs, there will be a common 
solution (R, a) satisfying � = R and «i = a where 
0(�,'it) = 0(R,a) = 0, Under weak uncertainty, the supposition under 
which firms make decisions turns out to be correct, 
But with strong uncertainty, firms differ in their perception 
as to the value of the effectiveness parameter a that they assign to 
their own and other firms' R and D efforts, Hence ex post, firms have 
made mistakes, Presumably in a multiperiod model in which revelation 
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occurs through the outcomes of a sequence of R and D games, these 
mistakes will tend to disappear, We first examine the case of a one-
shot R and D effort; later we look at the long run case in which 
perceptions of other firms' behavior are correct, In the context of 
the ''short run'' case, we are interested in R and D as between the 
weak and strong uncertainty oases, given that beliefs in the weak 
uncertainty case are centered at the mean of beliefs in the strong 
uncertainty case, 
IV, R and D E XPENDIT URES - C ONS ENS U S AND DIVERSITY 
Given a regular interior maximum of discounted expected 
profits, we can write R and D expenditures for firm k as � = R('\) 
k = 1, • • •  , n, where 0(R(ak)'ak) = 0 from the first order condition, 
Then, under strong uncertainty, where a varies from firm to 
firm, industrywide R and D expenditures are simply� = � R(<\_)•
k'1 
where R o  refers to R and D expenditures under diversity. 
On the other hand, under weak uncertainty, all firms are 
identical in all respects, including the value assigned to the 
effectiveness parameter a, with'\= E(a) for k = 1, ,,,, n, where 
E(a) = � � '\• Let�= E(a), Then industry wide expenditures under 
k'1 
weak uncertainty are given by RC = nR(a), where RC refers to R and D 
expenditures under consensus, 
In comparing industrywide R and D expenditures under weak and 
strong uncertainty, Jensen's Inequality is of interest, namely: 
k
�R(<\:) 2. nR(�) for all a1, , , , ,  an suoh that�= ; k� <\:• if and 
only if R(a) is oonvex in a, In particular, a sufficient condition 
for strict convexity of R(a) is that R''(a) > 0 for all a, where 
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� Note that from the expression for a�= 0(�,ak)' we have that. 
0(R,a) = ah(x) - 1 = O, where x = aR, and h (x) is a oomplioated 
integral involving R and a only in product form, Then we have 
R2• 2 R  0 aa "' ?RR + °i0R ' a a 
Thus it follows that R''(a) = 1R + ___!._ (402R - 0RR) which is a2 2 tA3 a "R 
generally ambiguous in sign, With 0R < O, R'' > 0 if 0RR 2. 40i; if 
0R > O, then R'' > 0 if 40i 2. 0RR' but these conditions clearly depend
on speoifio properties of the pdf's and the demand function for 
output, This leads into the following basic proposition oonoerning 
the role of consensus (diversity) in promoting R and D activity. 
Proposition 1, If 0R > O, and if 0 = 0 bounds a strictly convex set
from below (or if 0R < 0 and � = 0 bounds a strictly convex set from 
above), then�= 2 R(ak) > nR(;;> =RC' If 0R > O and if 0 = 0 k=l 
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bounds a strictly convex set from above (or if 0R ( 0 and � = 0 bounds 
a strictly convex set from below), then�< Re• We assume ai � <\: 
for some i, k in both oases. 
Proposition 1 oan be illustrated graphically as in Figure 3. 
Under divergent beliefs, firms #1 and #2 spend R1 and Rz for R 
and D respectively based upon the parameter values a1 and a2• Average 
Rn� industrywide R and D expenditure for this case is given by z-- = 2 , 
Under commonly shared beliefs where both firms have effectiveness 
parameter values of a, the resulting industrywide R and D expenditure 
would correspond to RC as seen in Figure 
3, Ro >  Re as indicated in 
Proposition 1, with 0R > 0 and � = 0 bounding a strictly oonvex set
from below, 
We should note that spending on R and D by a firm is related 
to the value taken on by its effectiveness parameter a. The 
-0 
responsiveness of R and D spending to a is given by R'(a) = �· Note 
R 
R0R+l > > that 0a =�a� < O as R0R < -1, For R0R < -1, 0a < 0 and �R < 0 so 
that R'(a) < 0--an increase in the effectiveness of R and D reduces R 
and D expenditures, On the other hand, for R0R > -1, 0a > 0 with 
R'(a) � O as �R � o. 
Thus it might happen that R and D spending is higher under 
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diversity than under consensus (� > Re) but that this higher spending
is concentrated among the less effective firms (R'(a) < 0) so that
less technical progress (as measured by minimum cost <1,l occurs under
diversity than under consensus, We return to this issue below. 
v. NASH OOUILIBRIUM IN nrn LONG RUN 
The quasi-solipsistic short run model is replaced in the long 
run by a full information Nash equilibrium model of the R and D 
process, In particular, assume that with repeated trials, each firm k 
discovers the pdf fii(Ci;aiRi) of firm i over its own cost for i�k, 
and in addition discovers the values ai' Let 
fi(Ci;aiRi) = fii(Ci;aiRi)' Then, since each firm is known to be an
expected profit maximizer, each firm can in principle solve for the 
values R1,.,,,Rn that jointly maximize expected profits for firms 
l,,,,,n, when these firms treat other firms as operating at their 
expected profit maximizing R and D spending levels, For example, firm 
k chooses � to 
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where Ri i � k is treated as fixed at its expected profit maximizing 
level, which in turn is calculated by maximizing Ei with Rj j � i 
fixed at expected profit maximizing levels. 
Let the term inside the square brackets above be denoted by 
yk(CL)' Then the first order condition is given by
Note that yk(CL) is independent of �· but depends on all Rj j � k.
Then these first order conditions determine some level of 
industrywide R and D expenditures R = 2 �· It is now possible to 
k=l 
say something as well about the rate of technical progress in the 
industry as well as the price that might prevail for the industry's 
product, 
In examining the impact of a certain pattern of R and D 
spending on the level of technological progress, what we are concerned 
with, of course, is the minimum level of cost achieved, Thus, given a 
pattern of R and D expendi�ures of <�
, ,,,, Rn) by firms 1, ,,,, n, 
let h(CLIR1, ,,,, Rn) denote the probability that the minimum per unit
cost achieved is CL' Then h can be written as: 
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Then it follows that the expected (minimum) per unit cost is 
siven by 
One interestins issue that remains to be explored is that of 
the extent to which the rents from technical prosress are captured by 
the innovatins firm, and the extent to which they are passed on to the 
public in the form of lower prices, This involves an investisation 
into the probability distribution over price P, 
As in the previous sections, let CS be the second lowest per 
unit cost in the industry and let <1, be the lowest per unit cost.
Then if P is the price per unit of output, we have either 
Pm CS with Ci, i Cs i p•(CL), or
P = p•(CL) with '1, i p•(CL) i CS' 
( 1) 
(2) 
Fisure 4 indicates the classes of events associated with these 
two possibilities, 
siven by 
Similarly, pdf2(P) = pdf such that '1, i p•(CL) i CS is siven
by 
with EP = J
�
P(pdf1(P) + pdf2(P) } dP,
3 
0 
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In principle, a comparison could be made between diversity and 
consensus in the lons run case just as in the short run case, 
However, thinss are more complicated here in that the system of n 
simultaneous first order conditions would have to be solved to obtain 
the oonfisuration of R and D expenditures R1, • • •  ,Rn for the diversity 
case, It is clear that except in special oases, oharaoterizins the 
Nash equilibrium under diversity is an interestins feat, Thus we turn 
at this point to a special case which offers some hope of tractability 
in solvins � the case of exponential pdf's. 
VI. A SPECIAL CASE: EXPONENTIAL PROBABILITY DIS1RIBUTIONS
Consider the case of an exponential pdf, a case investigated 
in a different context by Lewry (2) and Lee and Wilde (3). For the 
exponential case we have 
F(C;aR) = 1 - e-aRC with
f(C;aR) = aRe-aRC 0 i C i� , 
Note that :� = Cae-aRC > O, which means that an increase in R and D 
spendins leads to an unambisuously ''better'' distribution of per unit 
cost, since a hisher level of R results in a distribution of per unit 
cost that stochastically dominates the distribution associated with 
any lower level of R, 
3 If the marsinal revenue function crosses the Q axis at Q so that 
p•(O) > O, then the lower limit of intesration in EP for pdf2 isp•(O), 
With exponential pdf' s, the first order conditions in the 
short run case can be written as 0(�,<;.) 
• 
P (C ) 
4=ila2 
l+r k� 
Jm[J L - (n-l)akRkC S Q(Cs><cs-�>e dCs 
0 CL
-1 = 0 k = 1,, •• ,n, for Rk > O • 
In the case of the exponential pdf, we can write the expression for 
expected minimum cost as 
hence 
E(C f Jm 
L Ri• •• •• Rn) = O �
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Thus, it turns out that in evaluating the impact on per unit cost of a 
certain level of R and D spending, we must take into account the 
effectiveness of that spending as well as its amount, The short run 
comparison here is between i <;.Rk under diversity and n�(�) under k=l 
consensus. Again, by Jensen's inequality ''diversity pays'' if 
�(a) = aR(a) is convex in a,
19 
A sufficient condition for strict convexity of aR(a) is in 
turn provided by �''(a) > 0 for all a, where 
�''(a) =  2R'(a) + aR''(a), where 
Hence �''(a) Thus we have the following result, 
Proposition 2. Given exponential pdf's over the payoffs from R and D,
2 then if 0R < O and ORR l 40R' R and D spending in the short run is 
greater under diversity than under consensus, and there is more 
technical progress (as measured by E�) under diversity than under 
consensus as well, 
2 
The same is true if 0R > 0 with 0RR i 2 0R' 
2 2 However with 0R < 0, 40R l 0RR l 2 0R' E� is lower under diversity 
than consensus, but spending is higher under consensus than under 
diversity. 2 
2 Similarly, 0R > O, 2 0R i 0RR i 40R implies higher spending 
under diversity but lower E� under consensus, 
Similarly, with exponential pdf's, the expression for EP, 
expected price, can be written as 
EP = � (p 
i� 0 
which can be simplified to 
,/, •-1 
� - � -�(a )(p (P)-P) 
EP = J Pn �(;;)e-n �(a)P[ L e i -(n-1) ]dP 0 i-1 
where i/l(;;,) = ;;R(;;), 1/l(ai) = aiRi. 
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Let EPD be expected price under diversity and EPC be expected 
•-1 
price under consensus, with 6(a) defined by 6(a) = e- (a)(p (P)-P) 
By Jensen's Inequality, EPD > EPc for all non-degenerate frequency
distributions over a if O''(a) > O, 
We have 
•-1 
O'(a) = -1/J'(a) (p 
•-l(P)-P)e-1/J(a) (p (P)-P) 
with 
6" (a) 
•-1 Then p (P) < P by the assumption of downward sloping
industry demand, Thus a sufficient condition for 6''(a) > O is 
l/J••(a) > 0, This leads into the following, 
Proposition 3. Given exponential pdf's over the payoffs from R and D 
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expenditures, expected price under diversity of beliefs is greater 
than expected price under consensus, when ECL is lower under
diversity. 
Thus we arrive at the paradoxical conclusion that with 
,exponential pdf's over the payoffs from R and D expenditures and with 
expected minimum cost less under diversity of beliefs than under 
consensus, expected price is higher under diversity than under 
consensus, Because the industry operates with positive R and D 
expenditures only in the elastic range of the demand curve, this means 
that under these conditions expected profits (before deducting R and D 
expenditures) are higher under diversity than under consensus, 
Intuitively, what is going on in this market is that under diversity, 
there is a larger variance of per unit cost among the firms in the 
industry than there is under consensus, due to the variation in values 
of a among firms. This larger variance of per unit cost under 
diversity acts to increase the probability that the lowest cost firm 
will be able to charge the unconstrained monopoly price, or, more 
generally, acts to lessen the constraint imposed on price and profits 
by the latent competition of the seoond lowest cost producer. Because 
of the special properties of exponential densities, we have no 
assurance, however, that this result holds in general. It still has 
not been established that the paradox of lower expected minimum cost 
and higher expected price under diversity holds under pdf's other than 
the exponential. 
VII, OPTIMALITY AND MARKET DETERMINED R AND D EXPENDITURES 
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As the preceding analysis makes clear, the positive economics 
of R and D expenditures in a market environment leads to a minimum of 
predictive statements, Perhaps turning to normative economics might 
help, Here we have the two polar oases of Arrow's argument (1) that 
lack of appropriability leads to less than optimal amounts of R and D 
expenditures, and Hirshleifer's (2) that ''distributive gains'' 
associated with speculation can lead to a more than optimal level of R 
and D spending, Actually, in the model of the present paper, 
appropriability is not a problem, since the low cost firm is assumed 
to wield monopoly power (subject to threats from the second low cost 
firm) in its output market, Moreover, we have in effect assumed away 
the possibilities of speculative opportunities as well. What remains 
to cause problems from the point of view of optimality are (a) 
monopoly power by the low cost firm once its R and D is successful; 
and (b) problems related to duplication of efforts by firms competing 
for the chance to become the low cost firm, 
We do not attempt to address the fundamental conceptual 
problems t�at plague the notion of optimality under uncertainty, but
instead take the easy way out and use as our optimality criterion 
expected (discounted) consumer's surplus, using the pdf's 
fi(Ci;aiRi).:: fii(Ci;aiRi) i = l,, • •  ,n as ''objective'' pdf's. 
Thus, let W denote welfare. W is given by 
where, as above, CL = min C., and i 1 
It follows that at an optimum, where W is maximized, the 
following first order conditions are satisfied: 
....filY al\.l\. = o, 
In particular, for the case of exponential pdf's, 
- � aiRiC 
h(CL IRi•• • • •Rn) = 2 aiRie i= so that i=l 
- 2 aiRi�
.....fill= ak(l-� l aiRi)e i=l • Let ill\. i=l 
\1 -LaiRi�y(CL;Ri•• • ••Rn) = (1-� l aiRi)e so that i=l 
ilh 
al\.= aky(cL; Ri••• • •Rn)' where y is the same for k =  l,
,,.,n.
Then from the first order condition we have 
23 
for k =  1,,,,,n, where the term inside the square brackets is 
independent of k. 
Thus it follows that for � = max ai' R:i. > 0 with the first i 
24 
order condition holding as an equality. _filIf aj < max ai' then aR < 0 i j 
and Rj = 0, Hence we arrive at the basic nondiversification result 
for the exponential case, 
Proposition 4, Given that all pdf1s are exponential, then an optimal 
allocation of resources to R and D expenditures involves positive 
expenditures only by that firm k for which �= max ai' i 
In oontrast, oonsider the first order conditions 
oharacterizing a full information long-run Nash equilibrium of market 
determined R and D expenditures, assuming exponential pdf's, These 
conditions are given by 
k 1, ••• ,n, where 
is the expeoted value of revenue to firm k given that firm k has a per 
unit cost of CL' where a1 = i
�aiRi' 
given 
I 
Hence t (c8;ak) is stochastically dominated by t(C8;a1> for 
I 
ak > a1• Thus it follows by the fundamental stochastic dominance 
, 
theorem (see Quirk and Saposnik (6)) that V(CL; a1) > V(CL; ak) for 
ak > a�. That is, an increase in i� aiRi lowers the conditional
expected revenue of firm k, for any value of <l_· 
Rewrite the first order condition as 
I I 
y(CL;sk) is stoohastioally dominated by y(CL;sk) for sk > s1, and 
I 
for s1 > s1, which in turn implies 
I I 
for ak < ak and s1 > sk' 
It immediately follows from this that at a Nash equilibrium, 
25 
_.'.:is"' l+r 0VCCL;ai)r(«1,;si)dCL < 1 for i + k.
Hence under a market determined Nash equilibrium, as at an 
optimum, there are positive R and D expenditures only by the most 
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productive firm. And since there is only one firm in the market, that 
firm acts as a monopolist, choosing � such that the following is 
satisfied, 
At an optimum, we have 
�s: s: Q(p)dp
L 
hence the usual monopoly distortion occurs, 
Proposition S. Given that all pdf's are exponential, then a market 
determined allocation of R and D expenditures involves positive 
expenditures only by that firm k for which � = max ai' and the amount i 
spent is less than that spent at an optimum. This leads to less 
technical progress (higher E«1,) and a higher expected price than at an
optimum. 
This analysis raises the general question of how restrictive 
must be the assumptions on the pdf's fi in order to obtain a 
nondiversification result with respect to R and D expenditures in the 
full information Nash equilibrium case, Proposition 6 gives a 
sufficient condition for nondiversification, one which is satisfied 
for the case of uniform pdf's, and one which has some intuitive 
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appeal, It is not known the extent to which this sufficient condition 
can be weakened. 
Proposition 6. Assume that costs Ci are independently distributed,
all pdf's fi having the same functional form and differi
ng only in the
values assigned to the parameter si = aiRi. 
fi(Ci;si) = f(Ci;si), As above, let F(C;si) 
Thus 
c 
= J
0
f(Ci;si)dCi, 
ilF(C;si) 
���....._ > 0 for all C > 0, Further, assume that for C > O, as i 
with 
ilF(C;si) 
ilsi 
ilF(C;sj) > ilsj 
for si > sj, i,e,, F is strictly convex in s. 
Then an optimal allocation of R and D expenditures is one in which 
there is a positive amount of expenditures only for that firm k for 
which�= max ai. i 
c 
Let cf>(C) = J
0
0Cx; �, •• • ,Rn)dx, where 
0(x;�, • • •  ,R ) = l f(x;si) n (1-F(x;sj)), Consider the problem of n i=l J+i 
maximizing cf>(C) subject to l Ri = R, where R is a fixed constant, We i=l 
will show that under the conditions of the proposition, the solution 
to this problem involves choosing � = R for k such that �= max ai' i 
The first order conditions are 
i = 1, • • •  ,n 
where 
The second integral may be integrated by parts to obtain 
J
c 8f(x; Si) aF (C; Si) 
as 11 (1-F(x;sj))dx = a 11 (1-F(C; sj) 0 i jt'i 8i jt'i 
Hence the first order conditions become 
aF(C; si) ai as 11 (1-F(C; sj)) i � i jt'i 
i = 1, • • •  ,n 
Now with '\ = max "i' the allocation � = R,Ri = 0 i;. k i 
satisfies these conditions with 
aF(C; 'itR) 
� = "k as;:- > aiaFJ�:0)(1-F(C;akR)) for it'k. Strict convexity of 
F in s guarantees that this allocation is the maximizer of cf>(C) 
subject to l Ri = R. To see this, assume � > O and Ri > O for some i=l 
i t' k, Then if dRk = -dRi > O, we have 
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[ aF (C; sk) aF(C; s1) def>= dRk ak as (1-F(C; si)) - ai a (1-F(C; sk))] 11 (1-F(C; s  )),k 8i jt'ft'k j 
For'\;> ai' sk > sk' def>> 0, hence an optimum occurs at � = R. 
Consider next the optimizing problem 
max - i Ri - r{rP (x)dx} f)(C; R1,. , ,,R )dC i=l O C n 
"' 
Then since J P (x)dx is a monotone decreasing function of C, c 
and since 0(C;O,, • •  ,R,0,,,, ,0) (R in the kth position) is 
stochastically dominated by every other feasible �!location, it 
follows that an optimal allocation of R and D spending involves 
positive spending only by firm k, 
VII. SUMMARY 
The problem we have investigated is that of the role of 
diverse beliefs so far as R and D activities in an industry are 
concerned. Using a simplified short run ''quasi-solipsistic '' model 
29 
of the R and D process, we have shown that the effect of diversity on 
spending, on the rate of technical progress, and on expected price is 
highly sensitive to the properties of the pdf's over the payoffs from 
R and D, and of the demand function, Under a long run full 
information Nash equilibrium, and with exponential pdf's, all R and D 
spending is concentrated in the most productive firm, which spends 
less than an optimal amount, leading to a lower rate of technical 
progress and to a higher expected product price than at the optimum. 
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